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If, in the context of an ‘audit explosion’, public sector projects are subject to multiple and 
uncoordinated forms of independent scrutiny, then the different scrutinisers could reach 
contradictory conclusions, adopt incompatible methods, and ultimately provide less effective 
oversight. In the Australian state of Victoria, three independent scrutiny mechanisms operate 
concurrently on transport megaprojects. The three mechanisms – performance auditing, probity 
auditing and gateway reviews – are not coordinated and yet have overlapping goals relating to 
integrity and value for money. This paper describes the three scrutiny mechanisms, before 
presenting evidence that the mechanisms can generate contradictory conclusions that remain 
unreconciled, and that the mechanisms conflict in ways that affect the viability of at least one of 
the mechanisms. The paper concludes with a discussion of implications for Europe and directions 
for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
The role played by independent auditors, evaluators, inspectors and reviewers in public 
administration has a long history and, since ancient times, has been the subject of much 
discussion and analysis. In recent decades, major contributions to the academic literature on 
independent scrutiny institutions include Head et al., 2008; Hood et al., 1999; OECD, 1996; and 
Pollitt et al., 1999. The main themes in this literature concern the goals of oversight institutions 
(including efficiency, process integrity and accountability); the methods they use; their 
institutional form, and what degree of independence they enjoy; the status of their findings and 
recommendations; and their impact on public accountability and agency performance. 
The overwhelming majority of studies of independent scrutiny mechanisms assume, most often 
implicitly, a ‘vertical’ or bilateral relationship between a single scrutiniser and one organisation, 
program or project (or a set of organisations, programs or projects) that is scrutinised.3 The term 
that is most often used to describe public auditors – ‘Supreme Audit Institutions’ (SAIs) – reflects 
this singularity. Drawing on a standard German public finance textbook (Blankart, 2006), Blume 
                                                        
1 The author is grateful to three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
2 Centre for Regulatory Studies, Faculty of Law, Monash University, Victoria 3800, Australia, T: +61399054135, E: 
stuart.kells@law.monash.edu.au 
3 For discussions of standard conceptual models of auditing, see Leeuw 1996 and Lonsdale 1999. 
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and Voight (2007) claimed that ‘SAIs are monopolists...since competition between SAIs seems to 
be a rare exception’ (page 7). 
It may not be so exceptional, however, for public auditors (and public sector reviewers and 
inspectors more generally) to face competition. In this era of an ‘audit explosion’ and an ‘audit 
society’ (Power, 1999; Power, 2000; Bowerman et al., 2000) some advanced countries have 
experienced an increase in the number of bodies with independent audit and review functions. In 
several countries, multiple audit and review bodies now have overlapping mandates. For 
example, Williams et al. (2010) studied a British government accommodation project that was 
subject to scrutiny by independent ‘gateway’ reviews, the Home Office Audit and Assurance 
Unit, the National Audit Office (NAO) and the Parliamentary Accounts Committee. Kells and 
Hodge (2010) analysed jurisdictional overlaps between four public institutions with performance 
audit functions in a single Australian jurisdiction. 
As a consequence of the growing institutional richness, new research questions have emerged 
regarding the conduct and impact of public sector oversight bodies. Multiplication of such bodies 
within a jurisdiction means that there are important institutional relationships beyond the 
vertical or bilateral ones. When different bodies inhabit the same institutional space, there is an 
additional horizontal dimension to their conduct. For example, scrutiny bodies that cohabit the 
same space can interact with each other (Henkel, 1991; Kells and Hodge, 2010). Possible modes of 
interaction include cooperation, competition, ‘convergence’ (where the bodies mimic each other) 
and ‘divergence’ (whether the bodies seek to differentiate themselves) (Henkel, 1991; Kells and 
Hodge, 2010). In Britain, Bowerman et al. (2003) documented ongoing ‘turf battles’ between 
overlapping public audit agencies such as the NAO and the Audit Commission. 
In principle, interaction between scrutiny bodies might generate benefits for society. If, for 
example, multiple bodies are authorised to review the same projects and agencies, there are 
‘more hands to the pump’ in the scrutiny task, and therefore scrutiny may be more thorough. 
Also, multiple bodies might engage in benign competition, to become more efficient, to exert 
more effort, or to innovate by adopting new techniques. 
Another set of potential consequences, however, is less sanguine. With multiple scrutiny bodies, 
coordination problems might arise. There may be wasteful duplication of effort, or the reviewers 
could reach contradictory conclusions (a possibility given the importance of judgement in 
auditing and evaluation; see Barzelay, 1996; Keen, 1999; and Lindeberg, 2007), and therefore pull 
reviewees in opposing directions. The results might be higher participation costs for reviewees, 
and less effective oversight for the community. 
These dangers have led to calls for greater coordination of public sector audit and review bodies. 
In its 2010 report on ‘Assurance for high risk projects’, the NAO called for greater integration 
across the various mechanisms, including gateway, that provided assurance to government and 
the community about the delivery of major public-sector projects (NAO, 2010). In Australia, SSA 
(2010) recommended the establishment of an ‘integrity coordination board’ to better integrate the 
activities of public sector ‘watchdog’ bodies such as the Victorian Auditor-General and the 
Victorian Ombudsman. The potential pitfalls from the lack of coordination identified by the SSA 
included making poor use of the available information, duplicated effort, contradictory findings 
and public confusion (SSA, 2010). 
Less obvious is the risk that scrutiny bodies will adopt incompatible methods, or undermine each 
other’s effectiveness. For example, some scrutinisers adopt more discreet and ‘constructive’ 
methods – Williams et al. (2010) called these the ‘friendly’ scrutinisers – while others do not. 
Suppose there are two review bodies, A and B, who have overlapping jurisdiction over an 
agency, ‘TransCo’, and who have the power to disclose each other’s findings. Body A adopts 
‘friendly’ methods. This means body A works constructively and discreetly with TransCo, and 
delivers its findings, including any that are adverse, directly to TransCo, without publicly 
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disclosing them. Accordingly, there is a high level of trust between TransCo and body A. 
TransCo’s staff are candid and unguarded in their disclosures to body A, which is therefore 
uniquely able to identify correctly TransCo’s shortcomings. 
Body B, however, adopts a less ‘friendly’ approach. This body is dogged in the pursuit of 
TransCo’s failings, and their publication. TransCo’s staff are therefore very reserved when 
dealing with body B, and reluctant to offer up any more information than is strictly required. If 
body B has the power to discover and then publish body A’s findings, however, it may do so, and 
thereby undermine the ‘friendly’ approach of body A. This would affect the relationship between 
TransCo and body A, and could have a transformative effect on body A’s methods, or even its 
viability. 
These are just a few of the potential complications that could arise from the multiplication of 
independent overseers of public sector projects. In light of the potential complications, this paper 
examines three independent scrutiny mechanisms which, in the Australian state of Victoria, 
operate concurrently on ‘transport megaprojects’ (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003; Kay, 2009; 
Priemus et al., 2008) that are procured by public-sector agencies via competitive tendering. There 
is no single definition of ‘megaproject’, but the term generally refers to discrete projects that are 
multi-faceted or complex, and that involve large expenditures ranging from hundreds of millions 
of dollars into billions of dollars. The concept encompasses large-scale engineering and capital 
works projects, information-technology projects, and major services contracts. For the purposes 
of the present paper, a ‘megaproject’ is valued in excess of A$100 million. 
In the transport sphere, relevant megaprojects include new railway infrastructure, freeways, 
major port infrastructure, public transport ticketing systems and long-term public transport 
system operating contracts. Relevant modes of procurement include ‘public-private 
partnerships’, alliancing, design and construct contracts, and franchise contracts. 
The three scrutiny mechanisms are performance auditing, probity auditing and gateway reviews. 
The mechanisms have overlapping goals relating to probity and value for money. The paper 
describes the three mechanisms, before considering whether there is evidence of the kinds of 
pitfalls identified above. Transport megaprojects are an appropriate site to study interactions 
between the three mechanisms because such projects constitute a discrete sample of projects that 
have all been subject to the three scrutiny mechanisms extensively. The projects face similar risks, 
and are of high public interest around the world (Cour des Comptes, 2005; Cox, 2003; Flyvberg et 
al., 2003; Kay, 2009; Ware et al., 2007). Also, in Victoria, transport megaprojects have been an area 
of procurement innovation: Victoria’s largest public-private partnership was a freeway project 
(Eastlink), and transport was the first Victorian government portfolio to adopt alliancing on a 
large scale as a method of major project procurement. 
The principal contribution of the paper is in analysing empirically how three overlapping audit 
and review processes operate together. The paper seeks to deepen the literature on interactions 
between audit and review mechanisms. There are few analyses of this kind,4 and none from 
Australia that relate specifically to transport megaprojects. The paper is also relevant to the 
literature on megaproject governance. For recent analyses of governance regimes for 
megaprojects, see Flyvberg et al. (2003), Klakegg et al. (2008, 2009), Miller and Hobbs (2005), 
Miller and Lessard (2001), Priemus et al. (2008) and Williams et al. (2010); for analyses specifically 
related to transport megaproject governance, see Priemus (2010) and other papers in the March 
2010 special issue of the European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research, on ‘Large 
Transport Infrastructure Projects: Improving Institutions and Decision Making’. 
                                                        
4 Williams et al. (2010) examined several modes of project scrutiny but did not explore how they worked (or did 
not work) in concert. Klakegg et al. (2008, 2009) studied similar instances of project assessment, but also did not 
focus on coordination of or interaction between the various scrutiny mechanisms to which the projects were 
subject. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the scope and method of the empirical 
study, and the context of transport megaproject procurement in Victoria. Section 3 describes three 
mechanisms of scrutiny of transport megaprojects that are used there. In Section 4, evidence of 
contradictory findings and conflict between the three mechanisms is presented. Section 5 
concludes the paper with a discussion of implications for Europe and directions for future 
research. 
2. Scope and method of the study 
Three independent review mechanisms in the Australian state of Victoria were analysed. Data 
were collected from the Parliament of Victoria (from legislation, parliamentary reports and 
transcripts), the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office (VAGO), Victorian Government departments 
and agencies, and professional standards bodies. Only publicly available sources were used. 
Performance audits, probity audits and gateway reviews are the principal broad-scope review 
mechanisms that operate regularly on procurement of transport megaprojects in Victoria. 
Transport projects are also subject to investigations by the Victorian Ombudsman, but those 
investigations occur irregularly and display considerable variability in their subject matter and 
scope. The State Services Authority (SSA) and the Victorian Competition and Efficiency 
Commission have also conducted a small number of reviews relevant to transport, but these have 
not generally been procurement-focused or project-specific. Some issue-specific and narrow-
scope review bodies (in areas such as sustainability and equity) have also examined aspects of 
transport projects, but the projects are not routinely subject to these reviews, and the reviews 
have not focused on value for money or probity in procurement. 
Eleven transport megaprojects were examined: the Eastlink freeway project; the ‘regional fast 
rail’ project; the Tullamarine and Calder Interchange (TCI) project (freeway interchange); the M1 
Upgrade (freeway upgrade); the Port of Melbourne Channel Deepening project; the New 
Ticketing System (NTS) (for public transport); the Southern Cross Station redevelopment; the 
metropolitan train franchise; the metropolitan tram franchise; the ‘Improved local and cross-town 
bus services’ project; and the South Morang rail extension project. The total value of the projects 
was approximately A$16 billion in 2010 dollars. All the projects were above the A$100 million 
size threshold, and the average size was A$1.45 billion. The rationale for focusing on transport 
megaprojects was outlined in the previous section. 
The period of study was 2005–06 to 2009–10. During that time, all 11 projects were subject to 
VAGO performance audits. The results of the audits were published in the form of printed 
reports. The study involved an examination in detail of each of the reports to identify aspects of 
the performance audits’ scope and method. Also during the study period, probity auditing and 
gateway reviews became widespread in Victoria. Those types of scrutiny also resulted in reports 
being produced, but those reports were not published. Nor was the public routinely informed 
about whether specific projects were subject to gateway reviews or probity audits. Accordingly, 
indirect means were used to determine if projects had been subject to these scrutiny mechanisms. 
VAGO’s performance audit reports frequently refer to probity auditing and gateway reviews, 
and the detailed review of those reports was therefore also a source of information about the 
other scrutiny mechanisms. Using the performance audit reports as well as other public 
information, the author determined that no fewer than ten of the 11 projects in the study were 
subject to either probity auditing or gateway reviews (as well as performance auditing), and no 
fewer than five of the projects were subject to all three mechanisms. Precisely how many of the 11 
projects were subject to all three mechanisms is likely to be significantly higher than five, given 
the extent of the obligation to undertake gateway reviews and probity auditing in Victoria, which 
is detailed in the next section. 
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There are several reasons why Victoria is a suitable location in which to study scrutiny of 
megaprojects. A state within a federation, Victoria is a first-world jurisdiction with a mixed 
economy. It has many institutional and cultural similarities (and some geospatial ones) with 
other advanced jurisdictions in Europe and North America. Victoria has a bi-cameral parliament 
and Westminster-style government. The state of Victoria is highly urbanised. The majority of the 
population (of five million people) live in Melbourne the capital, and most of the remainder 
dwell in regional municipalities such as Geelong, Ballarat and Bendigo, with radial transport 
links extending from Melbourne to these centres.5 
Victoria’s public-sector scrutiny institutions and methods are similar to Britain’s and, to a lesser 
degree, those of other European countries. For example, performance auditing (also known as 
‘value for money auditing’) is an important part of public administration in Victoria as well as in 
Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and France. Another reason to study Victoria is the current 
level of transport infrastructure investment there. Across Victoria, a range of major road, rail and 
other transport projects are underway, with the goals of easing congestion and accommodating 
future growth. In 2008, the Victorian government released a ‘Transport Plan’ which featured 
projects to the value of A$38 billion. 
Before outlining the framework of megaproject scrutiny in Victoria, it is useful to introduce some 
other features of public administration there. The state’s principal minister (the premier) chairs a 
committee of senior ministers (the cabinet) which is the principal decision-making body in the 
executive branch of the government. With an annual operating budget of approximately A$50 
billion, the Victorian government is responsible for delivering healthcare, education, police and 
transport services.6 The executive branch of the Victorian government is organised into large, 
multi-portfolio departments. One of those departments, the Department of Treasury and Finance 
(DTF), promulgates whole-of-government procurement policies and requirements, and provides 
guidance and ‘best practice advice’ to agencies undertaking major tenders. Another department, 
the Department of Transport, has primary responsibility for transport policy and for the 
oversight of major transport projects. Other transport agencies in the state include VicRoads 
(Victoria’s principal roads management agency), the Port of Melbourne Corporation, VicTrack 
(which owns much of the state’s rail infrastructure) and the Transport Ticketing Authority. 
3. Description of the three scrutiny mechanisms 
3.1 Performance auditing 
The Victorian Auditor-General is an independent officer of the state parliament. The Auditor-
General is appointed for seven years (eligible for re-appointment) and may employ staff and 
delegate statutory powers and functions to those staff. Under Victoria’s constitution, ‘the 
Auditor-General has complete discretion in the performance or exercise of his or her functions or 
powers and, in particular, is not subject to direction from anyone in relation to whether or not a 
particular audit is to be conducted; the way in which a particular audit is to be conducted; [and] 
the priority to be given to any particular matter’. 
Since the 1980s, the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office (VAGO) has conducted performance 
audits of public-sector agencies, projects and programs. The adoption of a performance audit 
function reflected an international trend toward a more holistic approach to public sector 
auditing (Kells and Hodge, 2009). VAGO’s current performance audit mandate is provided by 
                                                        
5 Melbourne has the world’s largest tram network (245 km), and extensive road and rail infrastructure. 
Melbourne’s metropolitan train and bus networks feature almost 400 km of track and more than 4000 km of road 
routes respectively. 
6 Defence, immigration and border protection are national responsibilities. 
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section 15(1) of the Audit Act 1994, which states that ‘The Auditor-General may conduct any audit 
he or she considers necessary to determine – (a) whether an authority is achieving its objectives 
effectively and doing so economically and efficiently and in compliance with all relevant Acts; or 
(b) whether the operations or activities of the whole or any part of the Victorian public 
sector…are being performed effectively, economically and efficiently in compliance with all 
relevant Acts.’ 
The performance audit mandate covers all departments and agencies in the Victorian public 
sector. The Auditor-General has considerable discretion regarding the use of this mandate. For 
example, he has discretion regarding how many performance audits he undertakes, what he 
audits, the scope of his audits, and what matters are disclosed in his audit reports. 
The selection of performance audit topics is based on criteria such as materiality, risk and 
‘concerns raised by Members of Parliament, government agencies or the community’ (VAGO, 
2009). Transport megaprojects typically fit one or more of these criteria, and have therefore been 
an area of focus for VAGO in recent years. Approximately 30 VAGO performance audits are 
tabled in the state parliament each year. 
VAGO’s performance audits vary in scope and focus from one audit to the next, but the range of 
matters considered is broad. It includes project planning and funding, the procurement strategy, 
the conduct of the procurement (including the integrity of tender processes), negotiation with 
selected proponents, and all aspects of project delivery including value for money. 
Like all audits, VAGO’s performance audits are conducted ‘after the fact’, either subsequent to 
the completion of a project, or subsequent to the completion of a major component or phase of a 
project. Performance audits take a considerable length of time to complete (typically at least six to 
twelve months, and sometimes considerably longer). The principal direct cost of performance 
audits is the cost of salaries of VAGO staff, and the cost of consultants who are used from time to 
time to provide specialist input. 
The Audit Act requires VAGO to comply with Australian auditing standards in undertaking 
performance audits. The current standards of most relevance are: Standard on Assurance 
Engagements: ASAE 3500 Performance Engagements; and Standard on Assurance Engagements: ASAE 
3000 Assurance Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information (both 
issued by the Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards Board). The standards explicitly 
recognise that judgement plays an important role in the auditor’s decision making. 
Each performance audit results in a report that is tabled in state parliament, and is 
simultaneously published in printed form and on VAGO’s website. The reports feature a 
standardised format that includes findings and recommendations, which are not binding on the 
government or its agencies. 
3.2 Probity audits 
‘Probity’ is a flexible term that has connotations of integrity, honesty, uprightness, adherence to 
proper process, and being open to scrutiny. In Australia, the terms ‘probity auditor’ and ‘probity 
advisor’ have become part of the standard vocabulary for procuring public infrastructure (Shead, 
2001). A number of different definitions of ‘probity auditor’ and ‘probity advisor’ exist. Under 
one interpretation, the role of a probity advisor in a major tender is to establish administrative 
arrangements for managing conflicts of interest, communication with tenderers and the 
evaluation of bids, while the role of the probity auditor is to independently review these 
arrangements and how they are applied, and to furnish an opinion to the procuring agency about 
the overall probity of the tender process (VAGO, 2007). 
Under DTF’s procurement policies, ‘A probity auditor may be used if the procurement is 
$10 million or more; sensitive; or complex’ (DTF, 2009c). As transport megaproject tenders meet 
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all three criteria (size, sensitivity and complexity), probity auditors are normally engaged to 
provide independent assurance about the tenders. According to DTF, ‘The main task of the 
probity auditor is to provide to the Secretary, or his or her nominee, an independent and 
appropriate signoff on probity requirements, in hindsight, at designated milestones in the 
process’ (DTF, 2009b). 
Probity auditors must be independent of the project team. In most cases, and for all the largest 
projects, the role of probity auditor is performed by a private sector firm. DTF maintains a panel 
of suitable firms that departments and agencies can engage to provide probity practitioner 
services. These firms include lawyers, accountants, auditors and specialist probity firms. 
In Victoria, government staff and agencies are subject to a number of probity obligations which 
are articulated in several instruments including: DTF ‘Good Practice Guidelines’ on the conduct 
of commercial engagements; other probity and procurement guidance issued by DTF and the 
Victorian Government Purchasing Board; the Public Administration Act 2004; the Code of Conduct 
for Victorian Public Sector Employees; the ‘Conflict of interest policy framework’ established by 
the Public Sector Standards Commissioner; and guidance issued by the Victorian Ombudsman 
on ‘Conflicts of interest in the public sector’. In these instruments, the concept of probity is 
defined broadly and includes steps taken to achieve value for money. Probity auditors are 
required to apply the Victorian government’s probity principles and to monitor adherence to 
other relevant probity requirements. 
Probity auditors are given full access to project documentation and project team personnel. The 
probity auditors document their findings in probity audit reports, which typically are not 
published, but are provided to the head of the project or the head of the department or agency 
procuring the project. 
3.3 Gateway reviews 
Gateway reviews are a form of independent peer review that is increasingly being used around 
the world to improve the delivery of major public-sector projects. The concept was first 
developed by the British government, and a modified version of Britain’s gateway program was 
adopted by the Victorian government in 2003. Victoria’s gateway program initially applied to all 
‘major capital investments’ in the state, but has since been expanded to encompass ‘all high-risk 
programs and projects’ including policy, infrastructure, organisational change and acquisition 
programs and projects, and ICT-enabled business changes (DTF, 2009a). The gateway program 
applies to all departments and agencies in Victoria. 
Gateway reviews are undertaken by specially convened review teams at six key project stages or 
‘gates’ (see Figure 1). At each stage, the review team asks a standard set of questions to determine 
if the project team has taken all the necessary steps, and has achieved good practice. The 
benchmarks are sourced from good practice standards and documents such as the international 
‘Project Management Body of Knowledge’ (PMBOK) and guidance developed by DTF. 
The scope of gateway encompasses: pre-project planning; business case development; project 
approval processes; market analysis and market soundings; procurement planning; management 
of the tender process; selection of one or more preferred proponents; negotiation with the 
preferred proponents; contract award; ongoing contract management; and evaluation of the 
project’s benefits (value for money). The purpose of gateway reviews is to ensure that ‘good 
practice’ is achieved at each project stage. 
Gateway review teams usually consist of three or four people (DTF, 2010b) and comprise a 
mixture of government and private sector staff. All members of each team are independent of the 
project being reviewed. The gateway unit in DTF appoints review teams as follows: 
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In part because of the publication of performance audit results, and in part because, of all three 
types of scrutiniser, performance auditors are institutionally the most distant from the auditees 
(Figure 2), the relationship between performance auditor and auditee is more adversarial than 
that between gateway reviewer and reviewee, and that between probity auditor and auditee. 
From auditees, VAGO seeks formal responses to its draft performance audit reports, and 
publishes those responses in its final reports. The reports and responses indicate that the auditees 
are sometimes uncooperative with the audit process, and are frequently sensitive about the 
auditor’s findings and conclusions. Compared with the other two types of review, performance 
auditing leans toward the ‘blame culture’ in the sense of Klakegg at al. (2008). 
A pertinent question to ask is whether the three mechanisms are effective. This is a difficult 
question to answer definitively because data on the impact and effectiveness of the three 
mechanisms are not published. Even if such data were published, a problem of attribution would 
arise: because the three mechanisms have similar goals and features, it would be difficult to 
disentangle their separate influences on the success or failure of transport megaprojects and the 
integrity of tender processes. However, some tentative comments and inferences about the 
impact of the mechanisms can be made. 
Victoria rates highly on indices of government transparency and integrity (SSA 2010). In 
transport, some probity issues have arisen, but there have been no major scandals in recent years, 
and no significant instances of corruption. This points to the review mechanisms being successful 
with regard to their probity and integrity goals. 
However, it is difficult to draw causal links between the three mechanisms and the state’s 
integrity outcomes. Victoria has many other integrity-enhancing features, such as strong legal 
institutions; cultural values that underpin a respect for the rule of law; a public sector code of 
conduct supported by sanctions; an independent judiciary; free media; and other checks and 
balances including parliament and the police. It is not clear whether the three mechanisms have a 
separate beneficial impact over and above the other integrity-enhancing factors at work in 
Victoria. 
The review mechanisms have goals that extend into matters of value for money. While some 
projects (such as the TCI project) were delivered on time and under budget, delays and cost-
overruns have occurred on other projects, as have other problems relating to value for money 
(Infrastructure Australia, 2008; VAGO, 2010; VAGO, 2006). It is therefore possible to conclude 
tentatively that the three mechanisms have not been entirely successful in overcoming these 
problems. 
Several causes of this are possible. Addressing probity and integrity may be easier than achieving 
value for money, perhaps because the former goal may be amenable to more generic or 
‘boilerplate’ solutions, while the latter goal may require more complex and idiosyncratic actions 
for each project. Arguably, the incentives of tenderers and other private sector participants are 
better aligned with the government’s integrity goals than they are with the goal of maximising 
value for the community, sometimes at tenderers’ expense. These differing alignments may 
encourage firms to cooperate with probity standards, while engaging in strategic behaviour to 
maximise private profits. 
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Table 1. Summary of the three independent scrutiny mechanisms 
Mechanism Mandate Scope Timing Team Methodology Output 
Performance 
audit 
Formal 
legislative 
mandate 
All aspects of 
projects including 
probity and value 
for money 
After completion of a 
project or a major 
stage of a project 
Ongoing public sector 
staff (audit office staff). 
Supported by external 
consultants and 
specialists as needed 
Must adopt 
performance audit 
standards. Scope for 
discretion and 
judgement 
Standardised report 
style, with some 
flexibility in reporting 
approach. Report is 
tabled in parliament and 
published 
Probity audit Initiative of 
executive 
branch 
Probity (including 
value for money) in 
the procurement 
process 
Ongoing oversight 
through the 
procurement process. 
Periodic review 
reports at discretion of 
auditor 
Usually private sector 
probity specialists 
(consultants) 
Applies probity 
standards and state 
government probity 
principles. Considerable 
discretion about 
methods used 
Probity report including 
a conclusion (‘sign off’) 
about the probity of the 
process. Report is 
typically not published 
Gateway 
review 
Initiative of 
executive 
branch 
Six key ‘gates’ in 
the procurement 
process, including 
‘benefits 
realisation’ 
Before each gate or 
key decision point in 
the procurement 
process 
Specially convened 
mixed teams of public 
sector staff and private 
sector experts and 
consultants (for high 
risk projects) 
Rigid review framework 
built around the six 
gates 
Gateway review report 
including ‘traffic light’ 
rating. Provided to 
‘senior responsible 
owner’. Report is not 
published 
Source: Original table. 
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4. Evidence of conflict between the three scrutiny mechanisms 
This section explores interactions between the three mechanisms, and presents evidence, firstly, 
of contradictory findings, and, secondly, of the mechanisms adopting conflicting methods. 
4.1 Contradictory findings 
In the period of study, the three mechanisms had overlapping scopes: all three explicitly looked 
at ‘value for money’, as well as compliance with the rules covering tendering in Victoria. The 
mechanisms had similar goals and made similar claims about what they did and why. There 
were many examples where VAGO’s performance audit reports covered the same ground as 
gateway reviews and probity audits. This included compliance with procurement rules and 
guidelines, integrity of tender processes, and the achievement of value for money. For example, 
VAGO’s Eastlink performance audit covered ‘whether the tender process was well managed’, 
whilst in relation to Train and Tram Franchising, VAGO considered ‘whether probity 
requirements were observed’. These are core matters of interest for gateway reviews and probity 
audits. The scope of VAGO’s Fast Rail interim performance audit included ‘the tender evaluation 
and selection process for the project’ (ie. elements of gates 3 and 4). The final performance audit 
report for that project, ‘Delivering regional fast rail services’, encompassed project planning, 
procurement and delivery (ie. elements of all six gates).7 
As VAGO falls outside the executive branch of government, the Victorian parliament is the only 
institution that has authority over all three scrutiny mechanisms. With regard to private-sector 
probity auditors, this authority is especially limited and indirect. While parliament is the source 
of relevant legislation and the executive branch’s authority to operate, parliament does not 
perform a coordinating role or a directing role in relation to the three mechanisms. Rather, the 
mechanisms evolve and operate at different speeds and in a decentralised way. For example, the 
evolution of performance auditing reflects trends in public sector auditing, and the Auditor-
General’s use of his discretion with regard to how to perform his statutory roles, while probity 
audit methods and conventions are partly driven by commercial and professional trends outside 
government. 
Because the three mechanisms covered the same matters in similar ways, and were not 
coordinated, there was the potential for the mechanisms to reach contradictory conclusions on 
those matters. 
One way to avoid contradictory findings would be for the scrutiny mechanisms to ‘self-
organise’, such as by treating each other’s findings as substitutable for, or as acquitting the need 
to provide, their own findings. In other words, they could cede turf to each other in a limited 
way. In the period of study, however, the mechanisms did not do so, and nor did the formal 
arrangements for the mechanisms envisage such ‘self organisation’. In the gateway program, 
gateway review teams were not afforded latitude to use probity audit reports to acquit part of 
the scope of the gateway reviews. Likewise, probity audit arrangements did not envisage using 
gateway reports to address probity audit criteria. Moreover, because probity audits and gateway 
reviews occur before performance audits, it is not feasible for them to cede ground to VAGO. 
Conversely, it could in principle be practicable for VAGO, which has been undertaking 
performance audits since the 1980s, to cede ground to probity auditing and to gateway. 
                                                        
7 ‘The audit examined the adequacy of: the feasibility studies to properly inform the government’s decision to 
proceed; the development phase to put in place contracts which provided a sound basis for the delivery of the 
agreed infrastructure upgrade [and] the delivery phase to manage all the fast rail components to deliver the 
planned improvements within the planned time lines and budgets’ (VAGO, ‘Results of special audits and other 
investigations’, August 2006). 
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Nevertheless, this has not occurred. The emergence of probity auditing, and the implementation 
of the gateway program, were not associated with any reduction in the Auditor-General’s role. 
VAGO’s legislation was not revisited, for example, to make space for the new mechanisms. Nor 
did the Auditor-General voluntarily retreat from the subject matter covered by probity auditors 
and gateway reviews, or use probity auditing and gateway results to replace or reduce any of its 
own work. (VAGO did, however, use them to develop performance audit criteria and lines of 
inquiry.) 
Accordingly, the potential for contradictory findings was not addressed either by coordination 
‘from above’, such as by parliament, or coordination in the form of self-organisation among the 
scrutiny mechanisms. In this context, the study found evidence of conflict between performance 
auditing and probity auditing. 
During the period of study, VAGO was frequently critical of the conduct and findings of probity 
auditors. For example, with respect to the TCI project, VAGO criticised the probity audit report 
on the grounds that it did not include ‘an audit opinion, nor [was] there any reference to the fact 
that probity audit services were provided.’ In VAGO’s performance audit of Melbourne’s New 
Bus Contracts, it criticised the brevity of the interim and final probity audit reports. In the Train 
and Tram Franchising projects, VAGO criticised the probity auditor’s role in managing conflicts 
of interest. 
The most intense area of criticism related to the boundaries and definition of probity auditor 
roles. Throughout the study period, there was pointed disagreement between VAGO and 
probity practitioners regarding the boundaries of probity audit and probity advice services. The 
heart of the disagreement was whether it was proper for a single probity practitioner to establish 
and advise on the probity framework for a megaproject, and then audit adherence to that 
framework. VAGO criticised the combining of probity auditor and probity advisor roles (or the 
lack of a clear distinction between these roles) in the following six transport megaprojects: train 
franchising; tram franchising; NTS; TCI project; M1 Upgrade; and Melbourne’s new bus 
contracts. 
This conflict was not a minor matter. A significant part of VAGO’s NTS report, for example, was 
devoted to this issue, as was a significant part of the parliamentary hearings that were 
subsequently held regarding that report. VAGO used the failure to separate probity auditor and 
probity adviser roles as the basis of a series of negative conclusions about the probity 
arrangements for transport megaprojects in Victoria. 
In this disagreement, parliament’s Public Accounts and Estimates Committee (PAEC 2008) sided 
with VAGO, but the Government and DTF refused to endorse VAGO’s position, instead issuing 
contrary guidance for agencies engaging probity practitioners. In the NTS performance audit 
report, VAGO recommended that DTF amend the ‘Policy for the Conduct of Commercial 
Engagements’ to provide that, for major and complex tenders, probity auditor and probity 
advisor functions should be provided by different parties. DTF rejected the recommendation, 
arguing that a probity auditor could prepare the probity plan and subsequently report on 
whether there had been compliance with the plan, and that it was a matter for departmental 
heads to determine, depending on the particular transaction, whether the separation of probity 
auditor from probity advisor was warranted, and whether these practitioners should be engaged 
externally or internally to Government. 
This disagreement was not conclusively resolved. In December 2008, the Minister for Finance 
stated that DTF noted VAGO’s recommendation that probity auditor and advisor roles be kept 
separate, but went on to state that ‘the current policy titled Government Purchasing Board Policy 
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for the Conduct of Commercial Engagements [did] not require amendment.’8 At the time of 
writing, the Auditor-General and DTF continue to hold opposing positions regarding probity 
auditing. Probity auditors who continue to provide probity advice are therefore exposed to 
criticism from the Auditor-General, while agencies that appoint probity auditors in accordance 
with DTF guidance are similarly exposed to adverse findings from the parliamentary auditor. 
4.2 Conflicting methods 
In addition to tension between performance auditing and probity auditing, the study also found 
evidence of tension between performance auditing and gateway reviews. Specifically, there was 
tension between, on the one hand, the gateway goals of encouraging candidness in reviewees 
and frank advice from gateway reviewers, and on the other hand the Victorian Auditor-
General’s wide powers to examine gateway review content and to publish some or all of that 
content. The goals of gateway are supported by the confidentiality of gateway review reports, 
but the Auditor-General is in no way bound to preserve that confidentiality, and has increasingly 
chosen not to do so. 
In principle, there are several ways in which VAGO can disclose gateway content beyond merely 
mentioning that a gateway review has been conducted. For instance, VAGO can disclose: the 
number of findings or recommendations in a gateway report; the general subject matter of those 
findings and recommendations; specific details of the findings and recommendations; and the 
gateway ‘traffic light’ ratings. A variety of these modes of disclosure can be seen in VAGO’s 
performance audit reports. 
The NTS project was subject to two gateway reviews, and VAGO’s NTS performance audit 
report (October 2007) included detailed information about the matters covered by the reviews. In 
the report, however, VAGO did not disclose the gateway findings or recommendations. Indeed, 
before December 2007, VAGO did not disclose any findings and recommendations from gateway 
reviews of transport megaprojects, despite the fact that gateway had been in operation since 
2003. During this period, the Auditor-General effectively tied his own hands and adhered to a 
voluntary convention of not disclosing such gateway review content. 
A change occurred in December 2007, when VAGO reported on its performance audits of the 
TCI project and the M1 Upgrade. The TCI project was subject to a gateway review, and VAGO 
noted in its performance audit report that the gateway review had identified ‘exemplar’ practices 
within the alliance structure for the project, and that all recommendations arising from the 
gateway review were agreed by management. Furthermore, VAGO recommended that the 
project ‘should undergo a “Gate 6 – Benefits Realisation” review’.9 
VAGO’s reporting for the M1 Upgrade went further by disclosing a specific gateway finding as 
well as two gateway recommendations. In the performance audit report, VAGO stated that ‘a 
Gateway Review in June 2006 recommended that the management of the project to strengthen 
the West Gate Bridge should be brought into the overall governance and management 
framework of the M1 project’. VAGO also noted that ‘A Gateway Review undertaken in June 
2006 identified VicRoads’ limited experience with alliance contracting, and the resulting need to 
put in place a program of activities for key project team members to ensure that they have the 
required capabilities for their roles’. 
                                                        
8 ‘Response by the Minister for Finance to the Auditor-General’s Reports issued during 2007–08’, Government of 
Victoria, December 2008. 
9 In the TCI performance audit report, VAGO also published an agency response which referred to gateway 
findings in support of the decision to adopt an alliance approach: ‘The risk analysis supported some form of 
relationship contract rather than the traditional “hard dollar” contract. This decision was supported by the DTF 
Gateway Review undertaken at the time.’ 
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In May 2009, VAGO’s performance audit of the Port of Melbourne Channel Deepening project 
disclosed five gateway review findings, whilst VAGO’s June 2010 performance audit report on 
‘Management of Major Rail Projects’ detailed gateway findings and recommendations relating to 
the South Morang Rail Extension project. Importantly, that performance audit report indicated 
for the first time the status assigned by the gateway review team to some of the gateway 
recommendations. 
The South Morang Project was subject to gateway reviews in February and August 2009. VAGO 
reported that the February 2009 review found that the absence of a consolidated risk 
management plan and detailed risk register had: contributed to a lack of structure for managing 
project risks; resulted in overlaps between risk allowances and contingencies for some cost 
components; and made it difficult to accurately estimate the impact of risks on costs and 
timelines. VAGO further reported that the August 2009 gateway review found the project was in 
a ‘critical situation’ because the department had not made sufficient progress given its scale, 
significance and planned timelines. VAGO reported that the gateway reviewers found that the 
department ‘needed to act immediately on several issues’. In other words, VAGO reported that 
the gateway review had given the project ‘red lights’. 
These findings indicate that the Victorian Auditor-General has shown an increasing willingness 
to disclose gateway report content in his transport megaproject performance audits. VAGO’s 
relationship with gateway marks out a progression along the spectrum of increasing disclosure 
of gateway findings, that began with mentioning that a gateway review was conducted, then 
progressed to mentioning the matters covered in the review, then disclosing findings, then 
findings and recommendations and, finally and most sensitively, disclosing the criticality of the 
gateway recommendations. 
This progression has several potential implications for the gateway review program. The 
confidentiality of gateway review reports is a mainstay of the program, and one that 
distinguishes it from performance auditing. Paradoxically, as the Auditor-General increasingly 
uses his powers to disclose gateway findings, gateway may become more like performance 
auditing: if an expectation arises that gateway results will ultimately be published, then 
reviewees are likely to be less candid, and the review relationship is likely to become more 
adversarial and less ‘friendly’ in the sense of Williams et al. (2010). 
The methods used by VAGO and gateway in relation to gateway review content are in conflict. 
Could the conflict between VAGO and gateway be removed or prevented? Yes, but only with 
changes that would alter fundamentally the character of performance auditing or gateway 
reviews as they are practised in Victoria. Routinely publishing gateway review reports, for 
example, would transform gateway, while removing the Auditor-General’s discretion to publish 
information from gateway reports would be a critical diminution of his powers, as would any 
attempt to reduce the Auditor-General’s jurisdiction in matters of megaproject tendering. 
5. Conclusion and implications for Europe 
Transport megaproject procurement is one of the most reviewed aspects of public administration 
in Victoria. The multiplication of scrutinisers of transport megaprojects can be seen as further 
evidence of an ‘audit explosion’. 
The multiplication of scrutiny mechanisms has a number of implications for public 
administration and for society as a whole. This paper explored an instance where multiple 
independent scrutinisers examining the same projects have reached contradictory conclusions 
and adopted conflicting methods. While the scrutinisers were independent of the projects they 
examined, they were also in some respects interdependent. 
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There are a number of ways to interpret the paper’s findings. One is to think of them as evidence 
of an SAI asserting its supremacy over newcomers, or over ‘small fry’ reviewers operating in its 
patch. Another is in the context of the evident trend toward greater public sector transparency. It 
is a commonplace to claim that appetites for government transparency and accountability are 
increasingly ravenous. Those appetites are being fed by more extensive whistleblower laws and 
freedom on information laws, as well as unauthorised WikiLeaks-style disclosures. In the context 
of that trend, ‘friendly’ mechanisms that rely on secrecy may become less palatable and, 
ultimately, less viable. Yet another interpretation of the results is that they are one more skirmish 
in the long war between an executive branch and its external auditor. 
As was noted in Section 2, a number of European countries have adopted similar scrutiny 
mechanisms to those studied here; it is notable for example that ‘friendly’ review approaches 
have been used in defence procurement in Norway (Klakegg et al. 2008; Williams et al., 2009). 
Indeed, some countries in Europe have two or more mechanisms operating in concert that are 
analogous to the mechanisms studied here: in Britain, for instance, the National Audit Office 
conducts value-for-money audits of megaproject tenders10, the government commissions 
gateway reviews, and international accounting and audit firms offer probity audit services. The 
paper’s findings are therefore relevant to the design of megaproject scrutiny in Europe, and to 
European public sector scrutiny regimes more generally. 
One clear lesson for Europe is that there is a place for coordination of multiple scrutiny 
mechanisms, or at least for establishing a clear and workable hierarchy between them. 
SSA (2010) recommended greater coordination of oversight bodies authorised by the legislature; 
the evidence presented here suggests that the need for coordination also extends to scrutiny 
mechanisms that originate from beyond the legislature. A further lesson is that, in designing 
oversight mechanisms, attention should be paid not just to vertical or bilateral relationships 
between reviewers and reviewees, but also to horizontal relationships between multiple 
reviewers. 
The study’s results have a number of implications with regard to megaproject governance. First 
of all, insofar as independent review is an aspect of the megaproject governance, the study is 
further evidence of the dynamic nature of that governance (Miller and Hobbs 2005, Williams et 
al. 2010). Secondly, to the extent that external review mechanisms provide useful input for 
megaproject decision-makers, contradictory recommendations would make the mechanisms less 
useful for avoiding project pitfalls. Thirdly, if there is reason to believe that gateway-style 
reviews are more useful in megaproject governance (because they provide more candid and 
timely input) and yet this type of review is most likely to lose out in conflicts with SAIs like 
VAGO, then megaproject governance may be adversely affected. 
Underpinning the paper’s findings are several cultural factors. For example, the idea of making 
candid disclosures to ‘friendly’ reviewers (Williams et al., 2010) such as gateway review teams is 
imbued with assumptions and relationships that may be culturally specific. Similarly, the 
willingness of the Auditor-General to disclose otherwise secret gateway results may depend on a 
particular cultural context; elsewhere, SAIs may not be inclined to disclose these results, or they 
may move much more quickly along the disclosure progression than did Victoria’s Auditor-
General. A question for future research is how these cultural elements and dynamics would play 
out differently outside the countries from the Anglo-American cultural sphere. 
The paper provides a number of other possible lines of inquiry for future research. Such research 
would desirably characterise more fully the types of interaction that occur between multiple 
scrutiny mechanisms, including between gateway reviews and probity audits (possibly using 
                                                        
10 The scope and method of the UK NAO’s value for money audits are substantively equivalent to VAGO’s 
performance audits. 
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survey evidence or interviews with practitioners); examine the extent to which gateway reviews 
and probity auditing can be seen as strategies of the executive branch to claim the megaproject 
scrutiny ‘turf’, or to otherwise influence independent performance auditing; examine how the 
scrutiny mechanisms have been applied with regard to a wider range of projects in the transport 
arena and beyond; and seek to better understand the costs and benefits of the three mechanisms 
individually and collectively. 
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